Eleftherios Spyromitros

Correspondence: Eleftherios Spyromitros, espyromi@ierd.duth.gr

Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, Greece

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Abstract

This paper, using a standard model of monetary delegation, highlights the relationship between transparency and conservativeness of central banks. Precisely, we show that a lack of transparency about the output objective of central banks positively affects the optimal degree of conservativeness of the central bank. Empirical analysis confirms the theoretical link highlighted in this study.

Keywords:

  Central bank independence, conservatism, transparency

References

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